Sea World in Queensland, Australia
Helicopter Mid-Air Accident, 2023
Sea World in Queensland, Australia
What happened
"On 2 January 2023, 2 EC130 B4 helicopters registered VH-XH9 and VH-XKQ were conducting scenic flights from the Sea World theme park on the Gold Coast, Queensland. A pilot and 5 passengers were on board VH-XH9, and a pilot and 6 passengers were on board VH-XKQ.
After conducting concurrent scenic flights throughout the day, at 1356:06 the helicopters collided at a height of 130 ft, around 155 m west-north-west of the Sea World Helicopters heliport.
Following the collision, VH-XKQ was uncontrollable and fell to the ground. The pilot and 3 passengers were fatally injured, 3 passengers were seriously injured, and the helicopter was destroyed. VH-XH9 was substantially damaged from the collision, but the pilot made a controlled landing. The pilot and 2 passengers were seriously injured, and 3 passengers had minor injuries." (source ATSB)
"On 2 January 2023, 2 EC130 B4 helicopters registered VH-XH9 and VH-XKQ were conducting scenic flights from the Sea World theme park on the Gold Coast, Queensland. A pilot and 5 passengers were on board VH-XH9, and a pilot and 6 passengers were on board VH-XKQ.
After conducting concurrent scenic flights throughout the day, at 1356:06 the helicopters collided at a height of 130 ft, around 155 m west-north-west of the Sea World Helicopters heliport.
Following the collision, VH-XKQ was uncontrollable and fell to the ground. The pilot and 3 passengers were fatally injured, 3 passengers were seriously injured, and the helicopter was destroyed. VH-XH9 was substantially damaged from the collision, but the pilot made a controlled landing. The pilot and 2 passengers were seriously injured, and 3 passengers had minor injuries." (source ATSB)
What the ATSB found
"The accident occurred a week after the operator started using 2 EC130 B4 helicopters for its scenic flights. The pilots were conducting scenic flights in good weather, concurrently from 2 nearby helipads.
On the accident flight, an inbound call from VH-XH9 failed to register with the pilot of VH-XKQ, who was loading passengers at the time. Advice of clear airspace provided by the ground crew of VH-XKQ was obsolete by the time of departure. The pilot of VH-XH9, inbound, elected to wait for a taxi call from the pilot of VH-XKQ as a cue to arrange separation. Neither pilot was aware of the existence of faults in the radio of VH-XKQ that likely prevented broadcast of the taxi call.
Visibility was limited for the pilot of VH-XKQ (departing helicopter) by restrictions on manoeuvring at the park pad and the angles of closure of the helicopters. The pilot of VH-XH9 had sighted VH-XKQ on the park pad and discarded that traffic as a threat, expecting to be alerted by the taxi call if that condition changed. Neither pilot had further information to target their search for the other helicopter.
The location required both pilots to manage separation from vessels on the water, with VH-XKQ passing to the west and VH-XH9 passing to the north of the same vessel. Additionally, VH-XKQ had to check a second known conflict point, Sea World grass, for traffic, while VH-XH9 had to manage their approach to the heliport.
Limitations in visibility from both helicopters and especially VH-XKQ, combined with competing priorities and an understanding that the airspace was clear, led to a midair collision as both helicopters were passing through the conflict point created by the positioning of the helipads.
The operator had made changes to the location, facilities and helicopters to improve its product offering, and these changes brought unintended consequences. Over time these changes undermined risk controls used for management of separation and created the conflict point at which the helicopters collided. The unintended consequences were uncontrolled because the operator’s safety management system did not effectively manage aviation safety risk, and change management was incomplete or absent.
The operator’s procedures for scenic flights were not wholly specific to their operation and introduced variability in pilot decision-making and conduct of the scenic flights. Additionally, the operator’s system of radio calls, hand signals and conspicuity devices, intended to warn pilots of the presence of another helicopter, was flawed. As a result, both pilots formed an incorrect understanding about the location of the other helicopter.
Passengers on board VH-XH9 and VH-XKQ were incorrectly restrained. The ATSB was unable to determine the level of contribution of incorrect restraint to passengers’ injuries. However, sufficient research and knowledge of seatbelts exists to demonstrate that correct fitment improves outcomes for occupants of aircraft in the event of an accident.
The regulations required the passengers to be fitted with constant wear lifejackets in addition to the seatbelts in the helicopter. There has been no testing or verification of the ability of these 2 safety devices to be integrated while maintaining the integrity of each. As a result, helicopter tourism operations worldwide are fitting seatbelts incorrectly when combined with constant wear lifejackets." (source ATSB)
"The accident occurred a week after the operator started using 2 EC130 B4 helicopters for its scenic flights. The pilots were conducting scenic flights in good weather, concurrently from 2 nearby helipads.
On the accident flight, an inbound call from VH-XH9 failed to register with the pilot of VH-XKQ, who was loading passengers at the time. Advice of clear airspace provided by the ground crew of VH-XKQ was obsolete by the time of departure. The pilot of VH-XH9, inbound, elected to wait for a taxi call from the pilot of VH-XKQ as a cue to arrange separation. Neither pilot was aware of the existence of faults in the radio of VH-XKQ that likely prevented broadcast of the taxi call.
Visibility was limited for the pilot of VH-XKQ (departing helicopter) by restrictions on manoeuvring at the park pad and the angles of closure of the helicopters. The pilot of VH-XH9 had sighted VH-XKQ on the park pad and discarded that traffic as a threat, expecting to be alerted by the taxi call if that condition changed. Neither pilot had further information to target their search for the other helicopter.
The location required both pilots to manage separation from vessels on the water, with VH-XKQ passing to the west and VH-XH9 passing to the north of the same vessel. Additionally, VH-XKQ had to check a second known conflict point, Sea World grass, for traffic, while VH-XH9 had to manage their approach to the heliport.
Limitations in visibility from both helicopters and especially VH-XKQ, combined with competing priorities and an understanding that the airspace was clear, led to a midair collision as both helicopters were passing through the conflict point created by the positioning of the helipads.
The operator had made changes to the location, facilities and helicopters to improve its product offering, and these changes brought unintended consequences. Over time these changes undermined risk controls used for management of separation and created the conflict point at which the helicopters collided. The unintended consequences were uncontrolled because the operator’s safety management system did not effectively manage aviation safety risk, and change management was incomplete or absent.
The operator’s procedures for scenic flights were not wholly specific to their operation and introduced variability in pilot decision-making and conduct of the scenic flights. Additionally, the operator’s system of radio calls, hand signals and conspicuity devices, intended to warn pilots of the presence of another helicopter, was flawed. As a result, both pilots formed an incorrect understanding about the location of the other helicopter.
Passengers on board VH-XH9 and VH-XKQ were incorrectly restrained. The ATSB was unable to determine the level of contribution of incorrect restraint to passengers’ injuries. However, sufficient research and knowledge of seatbelts exists to demonstrate that correct fitment improves outcomes for occupants of aircraft in the event of an accident.
The regulations required the passengers to be fitted with constant wear lifejackets in addition to the seatbelts in the helicopter. There has been no testing or verification of the ability of these 2 safety devices to be integrated while maintaining the integrity of each. As a result, helicopter tourism operations worldwide are fitting seatbelts incorrectly when combined with constant wear lifejackets." (source ATSB)